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In March 2004, the European Commission denied approval for the
world's first generic biologic, Sandoz's human growth hormone
Omnitrope, 2 which likely reinforced the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration's ("FDA") general skepticism toward biogeneric drugs
at the time. Not surprisingly, in September 2004, the FDA also rejected
the drug, stating that it was unable to reach a decision due to
uncertainty regarding scientific and legal issues.3  The European
Union's ("EU") rejection of Omnitrope was a surprise, however,
because the EU had passed legislation in 2003 allowing companies to
apply for permission to sell generic biologics 4 and, in 2004, released
guidance regarding how to demonstrate similarity between generic and
brand-name products.5  Nonetheless, on January 27, 2006, the
European Medicines Agency ("EMA") gave Omnitrope the green light
when it announced that the biogeneric's studies showed comparable
quality, safety, and efficacy to its brand name product, bringing the EU
one step closer to full-fledged regulatory approval for follow-on
2 Edward Winnick, EU Turns Down Biotech Generic, THE SCIENTIST, Apr. 8, 2004,
http://www.the-scientist.com/news/20040408/03 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
3 Susan J. Ainsworth, Biopharmaceuticals, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, June 6, 2005, at 23.
4 Alison Langley, Engineered Drugs Open New Issue of Regulation as Patents
Expire, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2003, at A6.
5 EsPICOM, BIOGENERICS 2005: AN EMERGING GLOBAL MARKET? 44 (2d ed. 2005).
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biologics. 6 Meanwhile, the United States remains at a stand still: not
only is no regulatory system in place, but also, more importantly, there
is an industry-wide debate regarding whether a regulatory system can
even be created or implemented at all.
Recently, the world's first biopharmaceuticals, which include
many of the most expensive drugs, have begun to lose patent
protection.7 Although the world market for generic biologics was
virtually nonexistent in 2004,8 it is expected to become a $5.4 billion
industry by 2008, if favorable regulatory systems are put into place. 9
Generic biotechnology firms have lobbied for a favorable regulatory
environment for these products, taking the pro-consumer position that
health care costs must be minimized. This position is or should be
firmly supported by the American public, who save an estimated $8 to
$10 billion a year on generic drugs at retail pharmacies.11 On the other
hand, brand-name drug companies have fought to block generic
competition, citing both safety and regulatory concerns as
insurmountable roadblocks. 12
On a practical level, this debate affects more than just
pharmaceutical companies' bottom line. Whether generic drugs
become available and, in turn, their level of safety and efficacy will
have a tremendous impact on Americans' quality of life and, in some
cases, mean the difference between life and death. Although
prescription drugs make up only ten percent of health care spending in
America, drug prices are the most rapidly increasing component of the
entire health care system. ' 3 United States law prevents the government
6 Tom Wright, EU Agency Backs Generic Growth Hormone, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Jan. 27, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/27/business/drug.php. This
should pave the way for the European Commission, the executive arm of the EU, to
give formal authorization to Omnitrope within a few months. Id.
7 Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 21.8 1d.
9Id.
1d. at 22.
'i CDER's Office of Generic Drugs (CDER), Organizational Components,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/#Introduction (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
12 Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 22.
13 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health
Care Marketplace, 2004 UPDATE, Apr. 2004. In a study of Medicare and Medicaid
data from 1992-2002, the Kaiser Foundation estimated a 16.5% increase in spending
on prescription medications each year. Id.
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from negotiating lower prices with drug companies,14 which would
alleviate this problem. 15  While the introduction of generics would
reduce the price of these medicines by twenty-five to seventy-five
percent, the savings to the health care system would be significantly
more because biologics are some of America's most expensive drugs.16
Seniors as a group are likely to be more affected than other
groups by high health care costs because of their fixed incomes and
dependency on Medicare. In 2005, seniors were expected to spend
thirty-seven percent of their social security check on health care costs,
and these estimates are expected to rise to forty percent in 2011 and
fifty percent in 2021.17 The new Medicare drug benefit program
beginning in 2006, which attempts to save money on drug costs, is not
only voluntary, but also requires a $420 premium per year with
substantial co-payments.18 Unless Congress takes action to hold down
health care costs for seniors, official projections indicate that health
care costs alone will consume Social Security benefits by the time
today's generation reaches retirement.19 The introduction of generic
biologics into the U.S. market would be an effective solution to
alleviate high drug costs for Medicare recipients.
Employers are another group hurting from high health care
costs, which effectively decreases profits and increases incentives to
outsource overseas. For example, in the past two years, General
Motors spent $9.3 billion on health care benefits for current and former
employees. 20 The company expects to spend a shocking $63 billion on
14 William M. Welch, Medical Costs Eat at Social Security, USA TODAY, Sep. 14,
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-09-13-medicare-costs x.htn
(last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
" See, e.g., Alex Berenson, A Cancer Drug's Big Price Rise Is Cause for Concern,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006. See also Paul Wallace, The Health of Nations,
ECONOMIST, July 17, 2004 (reporting that prescription drugs in the United States are
much more expensive than in Canada or Europe where government controlled health-
care systems can negotiate bigger discounts).
16 Stephan Herrera, Biogenerics Standoff 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1343, 1343
Nov. 2004.
17 2004 Medicare Trustees Report, SMI Out of Pocket Expenses as Percentage of
Illustrative Social Security Benefit,
http://www.house.gov/stark/news/108th/news_2004-09-14 MedPremDoc.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2007). These expenditures include Medicare premiums, co-payments,
and out-of-pocket expenses. Id.
18 Welch, supra note 14.
19 1d.
20 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
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health care in the coming decades. 21 On the other hand, Japan-based
Toyota spends less than American car companies on health care
benefits because Japan, similar to Europe and Canada, has health care
programs with price-controlled drugs. 22 Instead of negotiating lower
prices with drug companies, a step the American government has thus
far been unwilling to take, the availability of generic biologics would
provide immediate relief to this growing problem for employers.
The current biogeneric stand still in the United States also has
the potential to detrimentally affect other countries as well. Some
international agencies assert that each day without biogenerics
negatively impacts the health of people worldwide who cannot afford
these drugs otherwise.23 According to the World Health Organization
initiative, the most effective way to produce and stockpile the amount
of medication required to treat the 24.5 million people in Africa with
HIV 2 4 would be to embrace biogeneric manufacturers. 25 International
agencies have asserted that the FDA's strict standard for
bioequivalence is needlessly high, which forces biogeneric drugs to be
removed from the international market and, as a result, results in
needless deaths.26 These agencies assert that a lower standard for
bioequivalence would result in the availability of more biogenerics to
treat more HIV patients and also collaterally reduce the rates of HIV
transmission in the affected areas.
27
21 Id. (citing Danny Hakim, Carmakers in For a Long Haul in Paying for Retiree
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 2004, at 1).
22 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
23 Mark Wainberg, Generic HIV Drugs - Enlightened Policy for Global Health,
352(8) J. AM. MED. ASS'N, Feb. 24, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/generic/wainberg02242005.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2007). See also William F. Haddad, Epidemics and the Generic Medicines Industry,
X(2) BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 213, 223 (Winter/Spring 2004) (arguing that similar to
the introduction of chemical generic drugs, the controversy surrounding the
implementation of generic biologics is largely political, not scientific).
24 There were an estimated 24.5 million people requiring HIV therapy in 2005.
Avert.org, How Many People in Africa Are Infected with HIV?,
http://www.avert.org/aafrica.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
25 Wainberg, supra note 23.
26 Id.
27 Id. The rates of transmission would be reduced because high viral loads are the
strongest corollary to transmission of HIV. Id. In other words, with more people
being treated for I-V, viral loads would be lower, which would decrease the
likelihood of transmission. See id. Further, antiretroviral drugs significantly reduce
IV levels in plasma & the viral burden in fluids such as semen, which would also
reduce transmission rates. Id.
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Regardless of the benefits that the introduction of biogenerics
could potentially unleash, there are substantial safety and efficacy
concerns that innovator manufacturers and the FDA posit as real
threats. The concern is that the premature introduction of generic
biologics into the market would cost some Americans their lives
because biologics are too complex to be copied with the current
technologY, which cannot accurately identify crucial changes in the
proteins. Further, for many of these protein products, there are no
analogous animal models that can be used for predictive value.29 As a
result, it is impossible to determine how changes in the biogeneric will
affect the population at large.30  Without any hard evidence to the
contrary, this point is difficult to refute.31
While the United States resolves this internal debate, biogeneric
companies have targeted countries with more lax regulatory barriers
and less intellectual property protection. This tactic allows these
manufacturers to gain experience in manufacturing and sales early on
before eventually expanding into the more lucrative western market.32
In addition to cheaper manufacturing costs,33 this head start, so to
speak, allows these producers to earn a return on their investment while
refining their capabilities--advantages that "wait-and-see players" do
not have.34 On the other hand, the introduction of biogenerics into
these countries may raise extensive bioethical concerns regarding
safety and efficacy relative to socioeconomics as these drugs may pose
serious threats to recipients' health.35 Nonetheless, whether this issue
28 See Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
29 Letter from Sara Radcliffe, Managing Director of B1O, to Susana Maria
Soobhujhun, European Medicines Agency (Feb. 28, 2005), at 2, available at
http://www.bio.org/reg/20050228.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
30 Id. at 2.
31 See Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
32 Dr. Hajimu Morioka, Considerations About Generic Biologics, PHARMOGENERICS,
Dec. 1, 2005, at 26, available at
http://www.touchbriefings.com/pdf/955/ACFB481.pdf.Morioka (last visited Jan. 5,
2007).
33 For example, during the Soviet era, a Ukrainian biological research institute
developed a sophisticated form of bacteriophase technology. Id. at 29. U.S.
companies have partnered with this institute to produce biologics such as interferon at
one-tenth of the cost of current methods. Id.
34 Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 24.
35 Cf. Wainberg, supra note 23, at 2 (rejecting the assertion that introducing generic
biologics into less strictly regulated countries should rouse bioethical or immoral
concerns. Wainberg argues these types of arguments will only serve to deny millions
of people lifesaving drugs and deny the world greater access to public health
benefits).
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goes more toward the countries' own governmental and regulatory
structures or falls to the generic companies or the international
community remains debatable.
Unfortunately, innovator and generic companies have
positioned themselves on extreme sides of the debate, which has
effectively stymied the implementation of any type of biogeneric
pathway. Although it has had nearly twenty years to prepare for this,36
the FDA has failed to act and is being pulled from both sides. The
more quickly the FDA implements a method for regulating generic
biologics and a standard for determining bioequivalence, the more
quickly reduced drug costs will go into effect. Consequently,
significantly reduced drug costs would alleviate an overburdened and
dragging health care system, which would in turn improve the
American economy and the health, quality of life, and lifespan of
people worldwide. But before this can happen, the FDA and Congress
must decide which side has the better argument, and how much they are
willing to risk to help the bottom line.
Part I of this article explores the extreme sides of the debate
between innovator and generic manufacturers and the arguments
supporting each side's position. Part II briefly reviews the United
States's current regulatory systems and abbreviated pathways for both
drugs and biologics in order to evaluate which pathway would be most
effective for generic biologics. Part III examines the regulatory
measures for generic biologics that the EU has adopted. Finally, Part
IV analyzes the potential regulatory pathways for biogenerics in the
United States and makes suggestions, in light of the EU's progress, to
facilitate the implementation of such a pathway in the United States.
I. EXTREME SIDES OF THE DEBATE: INNOVATOR V.
GENERIC ARGUMENTS
37
Proponents and advocates of a regulatory pathway for generic biologics
are sharply divided across industry lines, primarily by generic and
brand-name interests. Nonetheless, the FDA and Congress will
36 See Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
37 It should be noted that this classification is becoming less one-sided, as some
innovator companies are recently preparing to enter the generic biologic market. See
generally Val Brickates Kennedy, Pfizer Eyes Generic Biologics Market,
MARKETWATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/pfizer-eyes-generic-
biologics-market/story.aspx?guid=%7B 13CC469B-AE9C-4137-8B48-
E832E57896CF%7D (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
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ultimately come down somewhere in the middle. To do this, Congress
must balance the incentives for both brand-name and generic drug
firms. 38 While an abbreviated approval system for generic biologics
must be implemented to make them more affordable and available to
the public, the intellectual property rights of research-based firms must
also be respected to preserve the financial incentives that innovator
firms have to develop new products.39
A. Innovator Manufacturers' Interests
At the extreme, many in the biotechnology industry argue that the
creation of a fast track approval process for generic biologics is the
worst nightmare of an inherently risky industry that is already
struggling to attract the necessary capital to bring new products to the
market. 40 This side argues that current technology makes it difficult to
identify changes in the proteins and, thus, impossible to determine how
these changes will affect clinical results.4 1 Although physical and
chemical tests exist to determine the similarity between small-molecule
generic and innovator biologics, this side argues that these tests are not
scientifically relevant or sufficiently predictive to analyze these protein
42products. Because biologics, have convoluted chemical structures that
are produced in humans, animals, plants, and microorganisms, these
products recuire more extensive processing, purification, and
stabilization.4 Furthermore, for many of these proteins, according to
38 The Law of Biologic Medicine: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Biologic Medicine Hearing] (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Judiciary).
39 Id.; see also Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 2-3 (statement of Dr.
Lester Crawford) (discussing the policy goals of the Hatch-Waxman Amendment).
40 See Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 4 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch). This view is heavily advocated by pioneer or innovator drug firms. See, e.g.,
Biotechnology Industry Organization, http://www.bio.org. The Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO) is perhaps the strongest advocate on this side of the
debate and comprised of more than 1,000 biotechnology companies, including major
pharmaceutical manufacturers, academic institutions, and biotechnology centers. Id.
41 See Letter firom Sara Radcliffe, supra note 29, at 2.
42 Id. Caroline Loew of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the
brand-name industry's trade group, stated, "The process is the product. The
analytical characterization and therapeutic equivalence of a small molecule can be
determined by assays. With biologics, it's nearly impossible. Analytical methods
might not detect all immunogenicity. A change in the complex manufacturing of
biologics can result in unpredictable changes in the finished product that can result in
grave consequences." Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
43 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343-44.
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innovator manufacturers, there are no analogous animal models that
can be used as a basis for a predictive value in humans.44
In the past, brand-name companies have frequently asserted
potential risk to the American public as a means to block generic
competition and, as a result, gained an extended monopoly on their
products. Generic manufacturer Barr Pharmaceutical's attempt to
market a generic form of Premarin, a dru§5 derived from the urine of
pregnant mares, exemplifies this trend. Premarin, which was
originally produced by brand-name company Wyeth, had been off-
patent for decades and was free to copy as long as the generic
manufacturer could prove chemical and therapeutic equivalence.46 Barr
produced a generic version of Premarin and conducted all of the tests
required by the FDA.47 However, the generic manufacturer never
obtained FDA approval because Wyeth argued to the FDA that Wyeth
itself was still trying to fully characterize Premarin, and, consequently,• 4 8
Barr could not possibly safely produce or market a safe generic. For
more than twenty years, Wyeth has blocked Barr's attempts to obtain
approval of generic Premarin, asserting that Barr's tests are inadequate
and that patients would be at risk if the FDA approved the drug.49
Wyeth has even recruited several congresswomen and women's groups
to support its campaign against a generic version of Premarin.5 °
44 Letter from Sara Radcliffe, supra note 29, at 2. As a result, many biotech
companies advocate some type of clinical testing for follow-on manufacturers, which
may not necessarily be the same program as the innovator's. Id. Even if follow-on
manufacturers performed the same program, because each protein product is unique,
the tests may not sufficiently demonstrate safety and efficacy. Id. Thus, BIO
advocates utilizing product characterization, GMP controls, and relevant nonclinical
and clinical studies in combination. Id. On the other hand, innovator manufacturer
Pfizer makes the case that because of the enhanced complexity of generic biologics,
nothing less than full-blown clinical trials will suffice to prove safety and efficacy.
Id.
45 See Herrera, supra note 16, at 1345.
46 Id. For small molecule drugs, proving the chemical formula is equivalent is fairly
simple because the chemical formula is printed on the product's label, in the
literature, and in the Physicians' Desk Reference. Id. Typically, for therapeutic
equivalence, the FDA permits abbreviated safety and efficacy data for generic
compounds so that the generic producer does not have to undergo clinical trials. Id.
47 Id.; see also Leila Abboud, Raging Hormones: How Drug Giant Keeps A Monopoly
on 60-Year-Old Pill, THE WALL ST. J., Sep. 9, 2004, at http://www.hrt-
info.com/hrtnews_090904.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).




DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
B. Generic Manufacturers' Interests51
Biogeneric advocates assert that academics and the generic industry
generally believe that an abbreviated regulatory process "is clearly
within the scope of current science." 52 Thus, it is these advocates'
position that a regulatory process can and should be codified as soon as
possible at least for low to modestly complex biopharmaceuticals.
53
More complex biopharmaceuticals, on the other hand, should be
approved on a case-by-case basis and, as technology advances, the
pathway should be expanded to include these more complex products.
5 4
Generic manufacturers tend to rely on "economic science,"
rather than pure science, and advocate reliance on the FDA's own
historic experience with biologics. 55 For example, advocates reason
that the FDA has employed comparability for over a decade, and it
should use this concept to determine equivalence.56 Comparability
emphasizes that "structure equals function," or, in other words, that a
biopharmaceutical can be recognized as safe and effective for its
intended use based on analytical and biological comparisons.57 These
comparisons would entail proving a similar structure through surrogate
markers and an abbreviated set of end points, which would establish
that the generic product is just as effective as the original. 58
To support this contention, biogeneric advocates cite brand-
name manufacturers that have routinely used comparability in concert
with the FDA for changes to their production processes, cell lines,
manufacturing sites, and formulations of multiple biologics, such as
recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies. 59 The FDA allows
these changes based on comparability without clinical data to support
51 The Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) is one of the foremost advocates
for implementing regulations for follow-on biologics.
52 Gordon Johnston, GPhA Closing Remarks, FDA/DIA Scientific Workshop on
Follow-on Protein Pharmaceuticals, Feb. 16, 2005, at
http://www.gphaonline.org/AM/Template.cfin?Section=FDAScience&Template






58 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1344 (noting that the FDA "has accepted for ten years
that the technology exists to change fermentation, purification, even the
manufacturing site, and still produce an equivalent product to the original").
59 Johnston, supra note 52.
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safety or efficacy. 60 Thus, advocates assert that this same principle
should be applied to generic biologics.
61
II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SYSTEMS AND
ABBREVIATED PATHWAYS FOR DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Biologics 62 and Generic Biologics 63 Defined
The field of biologics is not only a rapidly expanding medical and
economic market, but some advocates also predict that biological
products, such as those derived from embryonic stem cells, will be able
to cure diseases that remain untreatable today.64 Biological medicines
65
are large, complex protein molecules derived from bacteria, farm
animals, and other living organisms often by recombinant DNA
processes. 66  These therapeutic protein molecules are more complex
and expensive to discover, manufacture, and use than chemically
60 id.
61 See id
62 The terms biological medicine, biological product, and biologics will all be used
synonymously for the purposes of this discussion. Additionally, the terms brand-
name, innovator, and pioneer will be used synonymously for the purposes of this
discussion.
63 The terms follow-on biologics, similar biologics, biosimilars, biogenerics, off-
patent biologics, and generic biologics will all be used synonymously for the purposes
of this discussion.
64 See Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch).
65 Examples of biological products include: monoclonal antibodies for in vivo use;
proteins intended for therapeutic use, including cytokines (e.g., interferons), enzymes
(e.g., thrombolytics), and other novel proteins; vaccines; immunomodulators (non-
vaccine and non-allergenic products that inhibit or modify a pre-existing immune
response); growth factors, cytokines, and monoclonal antibodies; cellular products;
gene therapy products; blood, blood components, and plasma derived products. See
CBER, Transfer of Therapeutic Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, http://www.fda. gov/cber/transfer/transfer.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
66 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 1 (statement of Orrin Hatch); W.
Wayt Gibbs, Can Cells Be Generic?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 6, Dec. 2003, at 48.
Biologics are complex because they are constructed from proteins, which are too
complicated to make from scratch; the proteins require a certain type of folding that
adds sugars and other chemicals to certain spots on the macromolecule. Id. See also
Erika Jonietz, Generic Biotech, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Dec. 2004, at 56 (noting that
because biologics rely on living cells, they have a "black-box" quality resulting in
unexpected consequences from even the slightest changes, which thereby affects the
drug's efficacy or immunogenicity).
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derived small molecule drugs. 6 7  Biological products are also more
difficult to characterize because there are varying degrees of molecular
complexity in different products (e.g., recombinant DNA, blood or
plasma-derived, immunologicals, gene and cell-therapy).68
There is no precise definition of a biologic drug because there is
no consensus regarding what molecular weight or degree of
heterogeneity (i.e., lack of uniform structure) should characterize a
biologic. 69  Additionally, so-called "minor" changes in the
manufacturing process may significantly alter parameters, such as the
three-dimensional structure of the molecule, the amount of acido-basic
variants, or the post-translational modifications.7 0 Similarly, different
manufacturing processes can lead to differing molecular weights for the
same protein.71  As a result, the safety and efficacy of biological
products are often directly related to the quality of monitoring during
the manufacturing process, 72 and this is why innovator companies
assert that biologics should be defined by their manufacturing process
and not the products themselves.7 3
A generic drug is "identical, or bioequivalent to a brand-name
drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality,
performance characteristics, and intended use. 74 Although chemically
identical to their brand-name counterparts, generic drugs are typically
sold at substantially lower prices. 75 The same principle and language is
used for generic biologics in the United States. 76 A generic protein, for
example, refers to a protein product with the same amino acid
sequence, a similar structure, and the same intended use as the existing
brand-name biological product.77 However, because of the inherent
nature of biologics, generic biologics are significantly more difficult to
manufacture and identify as equivalent to the innovator product than
67 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 2 (statement of Orrin Hatch).
68 European Medicines Agency (EMEA), Committee for Medicinal Products for
Human Use (CHMP), Guideline on Similar Biological Medicinal Products, at 4, Nov.
16, 2004, http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/ human/biosimilar/043704en.pdf.
69 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 4.
70 EMEA, supra note 68, at 4.
71 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 4.
72 EMA, supra note 68, at 4.
73 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 4.
74 CDER, supra note 11. See also Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 9
(statement of Dr. Lester Crawford).
75 CDER, supra note 11. See also Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 9
(statement of Dr. Lester Crawford).
76 In the EU, the term "follow-on biologics" is used in place of "generic biologics."
77 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 9 (statement of Dr. Lester Crawford).
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78generic drugs. This is due to biologics' large, complex protein
molecules and their sensitive manufacturing process.79
B. The Regulatory Overlap Between Drugs and Biologics
The FDA has different approval mechanisms and governing statutes for
drugs and most biological products.80  However, many biological
products are classified as both biologics under the Public Health and
Safety Act ("PHSA")81 and as drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")82 because of the FDCA's broad definition of
the term "drug. ',83  Ultimately, this overlap has resulted in the
regulation of some biologics under the FDCA and others under the
PHSA.
Before the FDA took control, the predecessor to the Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research ("CDER") approved biologic products
under section 505 of the FDCA,84 which today uses the New Drug
Application ("NDA") as its drug-approval pathway. 85 Simultaneously,
the predecessor to the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
78 Id.
79 Id. It is argued that "different manufacturing processes for broadly the same
product produce drugs with differing characteristics, such as molecular weight."
ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 11. Differences in the manufacturing process can be
dangerous to patients when there is a narrow therapeutic index or a relatively small
difference between a safe, effective dose of a drug and a harmful one. Id. An
example of differences between brand-name products of the same drug is the
increased incidence of pure red cell aplasia (PRCA) in patients taking J&J's Exprex
(EPO), but not in Amgen's EPO Epogen. Id
80 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Dr. Lester Crawford).
81 A "biological product" is defined more narrowly under the PHSA than a "drug"
under the FDCA as "a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood
component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or arsphenamine
or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic compound),
applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human
beings." PSHS Act, § 351(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 262(i) (2003).
82 The FDCA defines "drug" by its intended use, as "(B) articles intended for use in
the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or animals;
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals; and (D) articles intended for use as a component of any
article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C)." FD&C Act, § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C.A. §
321 (g)(1) (2004).
83 See id
84 Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, The Road to Follow on Biologics: Are We There
Yet? 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 389, 391-92 (2004).
85 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 8 (statement of Dr. Lester Crawford).
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("CBER") licensed biologics under section 351 of the PHSA,86 which
today uses the Biologics Drug Application ("BLA") system to approve
biologics." In 1993, the FDA transferred all recombinant proteins and
monoclonal antibodies to CBER except hormones, such as insulin and
human growth hormones, which remained with CDER under the
FDCA.88 In 2003, the FDA also transfered some of CBER's
therapeutic biologics to CDER.89 However, the FDA has indicated that
the BLA regulated biological products transferred to CDER, including
any successor products, would continue to be approved under the
PHSA. 90 Although the scope of CDER's jurisdictional control over
some biologics is increasing,91 CBER has approved the majority of
biologics under the PHSA.92 Further, it is likely that new biologics will
continue to be regulated in the same way.93
1. The FDCA System
New products that are regulated as drugs under section 505 of the
FDCA must satisfy certain requirements for pre-market approval.
94
This process includes the submission of data from early stage clinical
studies and three phases of human clinical trials pursuant to an
86 Id. at 6.
87 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 8 (statement of Dr. Lester Crawford).
88 Id. at 6.
89 See 68 Fed Reg. 38067 (June 26, 2003). The therapeutic biological products
transferred to CDER included monoclonal antibodies for in vivo use; proteins
intended for therapeutic use, including cytokines (e.g., interferons), enzymes (e.g.,
thrombolytics), and other novel proteins, except those specifically assigned to CBER
(e.g., vaccines and blood products). CDER, supra note 11. Immunomodulators (non-
vaccine and non-allergenic products that inhibit or modify a pre-existing immune
response) and growth factors, cytokines, and monoclonal antibodies were also
transferred to CDER. ld; see also CDER, Therapeutic Biological Products,
http://www.fda.gov/ cder/biologics/default.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
90 FDA, FDA Completes Final Phase of Planning for Consolidation of Certain
Products from CBER to CDER, FDA NEWS,
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW008800.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2007).
91 See, e.g., id.; 68 Fed. Reg. 38067 (June 26, 2003).
92 Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 84, at 392 (citing S. Usdin, CDER 's Abbreviated
Route: Regulating Recombinant Proteins, 10 BIOCENTURY: BERNSTEIN REPORT ON
BIOBUSINESS 17, Apr 15, 2002, at A6).
93 Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 84, at 392.
94 See id; see generally CDER, Investigational New Drug (IND) Application Process,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/indpagel.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2007).
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investigational new drug ("IND") application. 95 After the completion
of the clinical trials, the sponsor files a NDA with the FDA, in which
the drug sponsor provides the preclinical data and analysis, data and
analyses from the IND clinical trials, drug information, and the
manufacturing procedures used.96  Regarding the manufacturing
procedures, the FDA has established Good Manufacturing Practices
("GMPs"), which set minimum requirements for the methods, facilities,
and controls used in the manufacturing, processing, and packaging of
the drug.97  The nature -of chemical drugs allows the FDA to
standardize GMPs because the chemical composition and purity of
these drugs can generally be determined quite easily by chemical
analysis.
98
For drug products the FDA has approved under the FDCA,
manufacturers can apply to the FDA under section 505(j) of the FDCA
for approval to sell generic versions of the brand-name product after the
patent and other exclusivity periods have expired. 99 This is known as
an abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") process. 00
Alternatively, section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA also provides for the
approval of full NDAs if either the literature supports the finding that
the drug is safe and effective or the FDA has previously made these
findings.' 0' The FDA has stated that it believes there is less of a risk
for biologic products regulated as drugs under section 505 of the FDCA
as opposed to those regulated under the PHSA, and it would be willing
to move forward with consideration of the former. 10 2 This may be
because biologics regulated under the FDCA are less molecularly
complex (i.e., smaller molecules) than the products regulated under the
PHSA.
95 See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 84, at 392.
96 id.
97 See id (citing CDER, Drug Application Regulatory Compliance,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/ applications/compliance.htm (last visited Jan. 5,
2007)).
98 Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 84, at 392-93. In contrast, not every biological
product can be easily identified or measured. Id
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a. Section 505(j) of the FDCA
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Amendments ("Hatch-
Waxman"), made ANDAs available in section 5050) of the FDCA 10 3
The amendments established a shortcut in the approval process of
generics for post-1962 drugs. 104 However, as biological products were
just emerging in 1984, they were not considered during the drafting of
Hatch-Waxman. 10 5  Thus, the PHSA does not fall within Hatch-
Waxman. 1
06
Under Hatch-Waxman, generic companies can petition for
permission to submit ANDAs for products that differ from the listed
drug as the active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, or
strength if the change does not require a separate review of clinical
data. 107 In lieu of clinical trials, the generic manufacturer must prove
pharmaceutical equivalence (i.e., the same active ingredient in the same
amount, same route of administration, same strength, and same dosage
form) and bioequivalence to the brand drug. 10 8 The FDA uses these
factors to ensure similar equivalence in terms of safety and
effectiveness. 109 The FDA is statutorily prohibited from requiring
additional investigation, clinical trials, or information other than proof
of bioavailability from generic manufacturers."1 0  The ANDA is
intended to provide all of the necessary information to determine that
the generic is the same as the listed drug.11  If the generic
manufacturer establishes that the drug is the same as the brand-name
103 Id.
104 See Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, §
505(j)(2)(C), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(C)).
'05 Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 21.
106 See id
107 See Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), Pub. L. No. 75-717, §
5050)(2)(C), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(C)). In addition, the Act's provisions allow 180 days of marketing
exclusivity to certain generic drug applicants and a 30-month stay on generic drug
approvals during the litigation of any patent infringement issues. See id.
108 David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues
Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant
Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143,
194 (2005).
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and meets all GMPs, the generic sponsor can rely on the FDA's prior
findings of safety and effectiveness without having to repeat costly
animal and clinical research on ingredients or dosage forms.1 12
b. Section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA
The alternative way for a NDA sponsor to obtain abbreviated new drug
approval is through the 505(b)(2) mechanism of the FDCA."13 Section
505(b)(2) of the FDCA was also added pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman
Act in 1984.14 This mechanism allows a sponsor to rely either on the
literature or the FDA's prior findings of safety and effectiveness to
approve a drug product that either differs from an approved innovator
product or requires additional human studies for approval."' The FDA
and the applicant can rely on the innovator's data for approval of a
NDA without the innovator's permission as long as the applicant
certifies that the application is not patent infringing."
6
2. The PHSA System
Specifically designed for the regulation of biological products, the
PHSA mandates specific manufacturing controls designed to monitor
safety, purity, potency, and effectiveness of products that often cannot
be entirely characterized." 7 Additionally, the PHSA requires biologic
manufacturers to hold an individual biologics license for each
biological product under section 351."18
The pre-market approval process for a biological product under
the PHSA is very similar to the small-molecule drug approval process
under the FDCA, but the individual requirements for a biological
product are stricter." 9 The PHSA requires initial laboratory and animal
testing, three separate phases of human clinical trials, and the resulting
112 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 7 (statement of Dr. Lester
Crawford).
113 See id.
114 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27. This route was designed to cover NDAs and
changes to previously approved drugs, not biologics. Id. "It has been used for around
80 approvals so far, with another 30 under consideration, according to the FDA." Id
115 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 8 (statement of Dr. Lester
Crawford).
116 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27.
117 Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 84, at 393.
118 Id. (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 56,441 (Oct. 20, 1999)).
119 Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 84, at 393.
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data submitted to CBER in a BLA. The data should demonstrate
product safety, efficacy, purity, and potency and describe the
manufacturing processes in order to gain BLA approval.
120
Because the resulting safety and purity of the product depends
on the adhesion to the processes outlined in the BLA, if any minor
change is made to the product, process, controls, equipment, facilities,
personnel, or labeling originally denoted in the application, the sponsor
must notify the FDA and demonstrate that the change does not
adversely affect the product's safety or effectiveness. 12 1 Additionally,
pre- and post-approval inspection of the manufacturing facilities is
performed, and lot testing may be required. 122 Unlike small-molecule
drugs, oversight of the manufacturing process is a necessary component
of biologics regulation and has been historically difficult.
123
There is no provision in the PHSA analogous to the FDCA's
sections 505(j) or 505(b)(2) for abbreviated approval.124 The FDA has
stated that "regardless of the state of the science of protein
characterization," it does not believe it currently has the authority to
approve generic biologics under section 351 of the PHSA.125 This is
because it has not been possible to assess relative sameness with a high
degree of certainty for protein drug products that are large, complex
molecules derived from biological sources.
126
III. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S REGULATIONS ON
BIOSIMILARS
When the EU passed legislation in 2003 that allowed companies to
apply for permission to sell generic versions of biologics, many
commentators expected the United States to follow.' 27 During the July
2005 FDA Committee Hearing, FDA Commissioner Dr. Crawford
acknowledged that technological progress regarding the chemistry of
protein molecules, in addition to the European Medicine Evaluation
Agency's work in this area, has increased the likelihood of the FDA's
120 Id.
121 Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 601.12).
122 Id,
123 Id. at 393-94.
124 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 8 (statement of Dr. Lester Crawford)
125 Id.
126 Id. at 9.
127 See Langley, supra note 4, at A6.
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approval of generic biologics. 12 8 In addition to its 2003 regulatory
reforms that established specific provisions for biosimilars, by October
2005, the EU had both released guidelines on how to demonstrate
similarity between a product and its reference product and closed the
forum for comments. 129 The EMA has also issued guidance documents
on most of the major products. 30 Thus, the EU is some years ahead of
the United States on paper because lawmakers have established that the
EMA can approve biogenerics. 13 1  Furthermore, unlike the United
States, the majority of the EU governments are supportive of controlled
pharmaceutical spending and willing to use biogenerics as a way to
contain costs.
132
A. European Medicines Agency
The EMA is the European equivalent of the FDA. It is a decentralized
body of the EU that evaluates and supervises medicinal products
throughout the EU.13 3 To get marketing approval, companies submit
one marketing authorization application to the EMA and an evaluation
is then carried out by the Committee for Medicinal Products for Human
Use ("CHMP"). 134  If CHMP concludes that the product's quality,
safety, and efficacy are sufficient, it adopts a "positive opinion" that is
sent to the European Commission ("EC"), which transforms the
opinion into a single market authorization valid throughout the EU.
35
128 House of Representatives Appropriations Comm., Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Subcomm. Comm. Hearing,
110th Cong. 12 (2005) (statement of Lester Crawford, FDA Administrator). The
FDA intended to release a plan for comment in the Fall of 2005 or Spring of 2006.
Id. at 12-13. The "nature and quality of the comments" would then dictate when the
regulations would be implemented. Id. However, the process could take as long as
five years because of disagreements within the medical and scientific communities
regarding whether this can be done. Id.
129 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 44.
130 Id. at 3.
131 Id. at 18.
132 id.
133 European Medicines Agency, About the EMEA--Structure,
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B. Approval Mechanisms and Data Requirements' 36
The EU's regulatory reforms create a new approval process where the
amount of data required is greater than that for small-molecule generic
applications, but less than that for new drug applications. 137 The new
regulations lay out the definition of biosimilars 138 and the mechanism
to get them approved. 39  Data requirements are delineated in the
Annex, updated by 2003/63/EC. 140  Although the legislation does not
prohibit attempting to prove bioequivalence, this is not the preferred
option. 141
CHMP also issued a "Guideline on Similar Biologic Medicinal
Products" in November 2004, which denotes how to demonstrate
similarity between follow-on and innovator products, with an October
136 The CHMP uses the term "similar biological product" instead of "generic
medicinal product" because the follow-on biologic products, by definition, are not
generic because there may be subtle differences among different manufacturers or
compared with various reference products. EMEA, supra note 68, at 4.
137 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 42. See Directive 2004/27/ED, March 2004, which
was published in the Official Journal of the European Union L136, 30.4.2004,
available at
http://dg3.eudra.org/F2/review/doc/finalApubl/Dir_2004 27 20040430_EN.pdf (last
visited Jan. 5, 2007) (hereinafter Directive 2004/27/ED).
138 Directive 2004/27/ED defines a biosimilar as the following: "Biological medicinal
products similar to a reference medicinal product do not usually meet all the
conditions to be considered as a generic medicinal product mainly due to
manufacturing process characteristics, raw materials used, molecular characteristics
and therapeutic modes of action. When a biological medicinal product does not meet
all the conditions to be considered as a generic medicinal product, the results of
appropriate tests should be provided in order to fulfil the requirements related to
safety (pre-clinical tests) or to efficacy (clinical tests) or to both." Introduction,
clause 15.
139 Directive 2004/27/ED lays out the mechanism for approval as follows: "Where a
biological medicinal product which is similar to a reference biological product does
not meet the conditions in the definition of generic medicinal products, owing to, in
particular, differences relating to raw materials or differences in manufacturing
processes of the biological medicinal product and the reference biological medicinal
product, the results of appropriate pre-clinical tests or clinical trials relating to these
conditions must be provided. The type and quantity of supplementary data to be
provided must comply with the relevant criteria stated in Annex I and the related
detailed guidelines. The results of other tests and trials from the reference medicinal
product's dossier shall not be provided." Article 10, clause 4.
140 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 43. See Annex, available at
http://dg3.eudra.org/F2/review/doc /2003_June/directcomm_2003_63_en%20.pdf
(last visited Jan. 5, 2007).
14' ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 43.
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2005 deadline for comments. 142 To facilitate this, CHMP has released
product-specific guidelines that outline the best indicia for
demonstrating equivalence between a product and its reference product
using therapeutic equivalence rather than bioequivalence. 1
43
1. The Biosimilar Approach
The guidelines contain a "Biosimilar Approach" section that notes that
the standard generic approach for chemically derived products, which
consists of the demonstration of bioequivalence using a reference
medicinal product and bioavailability studies, is not scientifically
applicable to biological/biotechnology-derived products. 144 Biosimilar
products are approvable if they use a reference innovator product that
has already been granted a marketing authorization and the product's
data protection period has expired. 145 The biosimilar applicant must
provide the typical pharmaceutical, chemical and biological data,
bioequivalence and bio-availability data, and additional toxicological
and other appropriate non-clinical and clinical data.' 46 The additional
data will depend on the level of complexity and diversity of the
products, which will be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
147
A biosimilar approach is based on comparability exercises for
biologics. 148 Whether a product will gain approval under the biosimilar
142 Id. at 44; Paul Brown and Nicola Dagg, European Union: Follow-on Biologics
CHMP Issues Draft Guidelines on Similar Biological Medicinal Products, LOVELLS,
June 9, 2005, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=32077&latestnews=1 (last visited Jan. 5, 2007). The revised versions of the
guidelines should be published in the first quarter of 2006. E-mail from Denisa De
Chiara of the EMA Pre-Authorisation Evaluation of Medicines for Human Use,
Safety, and Efficacy of Medicines to Jessica Underwood (Nov. 14, 2005, 08:30:08
CST) (on file with author). See generally http://www.EMEA.eu.int (last visited Jan.
5, 2007).
143 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 44.144 EMEA, supra note 68, at 4.
145 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 3.
146 Id. The data from the clinical trials will probably be more abbreviated that those
required for a new drug application. Id See generally EMEA, CHMP, Guideline on
Comparability of Medicinal Products Containing Biotechnoloy-derived Proteins as
Active Substance-Non-Clinical and Clinical Issues, June 2004, available at
http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/ewp/309702en.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2007)
(discussing the clinical and non-clinical data required to show similarity to the
original product in terms of quality, safety, and efficacy for applications where
comparability is at issue).
147 Id
148 EMEA, supra note 68, at 4.
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approach will depend on the state of the art of the analytical
procedures, the manufacturing processes employed, and the clinical and
regulatory experiences to date. 149 Comparability exercises "are more
likely to be applied to highly purified products" because they can be
thoroughly characterized, such as biotechnology-derived medicinal
products. 50  While the law does not specifically prohibit it, the
biosimilar approach is more difficult to apply to biological medicinal
products that are more difficult by nature to characterize.' 51 Thus,
requirements to demonstrate safety and efficacy are essentially product-
class specific, and if product-class specific guidance has not been
defined, the "follow-on" biologic is determined on a case-by-case
basis. 152 The product-class specific guidelines, including changes in
the manufacturing processes and the demonstration of similarities to the
reference medicinal product, will regularly be revised according to
changes in technology or the legal framework.' 53
For example, the EU's guidance on EPO establishes that
"equivalent therapeutic efficiency" can be demonstrated in at least two
preferably double-blind randomized parallel group clinical trials.
154
The guidance suggests people with renal anaemia would make the best
study population because the condition is relatively sensitive to the
effects of EPO. 155 After a titration phase, the comparative phase of
trials should be at least twelve weeks, followed by a maintenance study
of at least three months. 56  Therapeutic equivalence must be
demonstrated for both pre-dialysis and haemodialysis patients. 157 The
clinical trials should include at least three hundred patients with twelve
months of immunogenicity data.158 Additionally, the applicant must
submit a pharmacoviligance plan to address immunogenicity and
149 id.
150 id.
151 Id. These include biological substances derived from biological sources and
products for which little clinical and regulatory data exists, such as gene and cell
therapy products. Id
152 EMEA, supra note 68, at 6. See also Brown and Dagg, supra note 144, at 1.
Class-product specific guidelines have been and are going to be made progressively
available that address unique issues associated with the class-product, such as quality
issues of comparability and clinical and non-clinical issues. See EMEA, supra note
68, at 4, 6.
153 EMLEA, supra note 68, at 6.
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potentially adverse effects.159 Approval for renal failure may allow the
follow-on EPO to be approved for other application if the mode of
action is the same and "appropriately justified by current scientific
knowledge."' 
60
2. Choice of Reference Product
The EU system attempts to establish an independent reference product.
The biogeneric's active substance must be molecularly and biologically
similar to the reference product's active substance.' 1 The biosimilar
manufacturer would use the same reference product for all quality,
safety, and efficacy studies so that the form, strength, and route of
administration would be the same as the reference medicinal product.'
62
If there were differences, the manufacturer would have to provide non-
clinical and/or clinical trials to establish the safety and efficacy of the
generic, and it must be justified on a case-by-case basis.' 63  For
example, if a company manufacturers a medicinal product containing
interferon alfa-2a that it claims is biosimilar to another biological
medicinal product, the reference medicinal product should be one
containing interferon alfa-2a as its active substance.1
64
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL REGULATORY
PATHWAYS FOR FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
There is currently no regulatory mechanism for most biosimilar
products in the United States.' 6 5  Middle of the road bystanders
acknowledge that many, if not all, generic biologics will require at least
some type of human clinical testing.' 66 More lenient advocates suggest
following commonsense rules in lieu of expensive, randomized clinical
trials that would stymie the goal of making these drugs immediately
available. 167  For example, equivalence could be determined using
159 Id. Pharmacovigilance relies on spontaneous reports from health professionals to
determine detrimental drug reactions. Letter from Sara Radcliffe, supra note 29, at 6.
160 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 45.




165 See ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 25.
166 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
167 Wainberg, supra note 23, at 1.
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stringent chemical tests that are readily available. 168 Animal and tissue
culture studies, biochemical studies, and short-term clinical trials
demonstrating equivalence regarding the drugs' plasma levels and half-
lives could be used to show efficacy and nontoxicity.
69
Additionally, although it is difficult to determine equivalence
between different biogeneric products regarding the level of
immunogenicity, full clinical trials might not be the answer. 170 Even
large trials involving thousands of patients have only a small chance of
pinpointing immunogenicity problems. 17 1  Further, trials themselves
have the potential to be dangerous by instilling a false sense of security
in the parties involved. 172 Thus, uncertainties surrounding biogenerics
might be more likely to be identified by extensive pharmacoviligance
and post-marketing surveillance of patients taking the drug. 173 This
way, potential problems could be dealt with and resolved as they
arise. 174
Biogenerics advocates 75 have argued that the FDA has the
authority to approve generic biopharmaceuticals NDAs under section
505(b)(2) of the FDCA and accept paper BLAs in support of biologic
applications under section 351 of the PHSA. 176 Under section 351 of
the PHSA, generic manufacturers would need to be given licensure if
certain requirements, such as safety and efficacy studies, are met.
177
Alternatively, the FDA may have the authority to approve generic
biologics under section 5050) of the FDCA 178 when bioequivalence




170 Immunogenicity is defined as the immune response that a drug elicits in the
individual patient. ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 13. Immunogenicity can be
significantly different for products that are deemed very similar, such as with EPO,
where Eprex has been associated with pure red cell aplasia (PRCA), while other
versions of EPO have not. Id. Slight changes in the molecular composition of the
drug are responsible for these widely varying immune responses. Id




175 The Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) is one such advocate.
176 See Generic Pharmaceutical Association, Materials for January 30, 2002 Meeting
with FDA, at 18, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/GPHAJan21.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2007).
177 Id.
178 See generally 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
179 Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 179, at 34.
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Two major areas of controversy exist regarding an abbreviated
biogenerics pathway.' 80 First, the level of clinical trial data that the
generic applicant must provide is at issue.' 8  Brand name companies
argue that generic manufacturers should provide the same level of data
that was required for their innovator products, while generic
manufacturers argue for less data.' 82 Secondly, the use of innovator
data to support follow-on applications is at issue because innovator
companies assert this is a Fifth Amendment takings issue.83
A. Generally, Define Terms Narrowly
Regardless of the pathway eventually adopted, the strategy used by
CHMP of defining terms and concepts narrowly will not only give the
FDA's potential pathway flexibility, but also circumvent ambiguity.
CHMP's guidelines evidence a strong effort to define each term
narrowly, which redefines and eliminates many of the issues at hand.
For example, the guidelines use the term "biosimilar" instead of
"generic" to dispel even the expectation that a biosimilar will be
exactly the same as its brand-name counterpart.' 84 This technique will
also promote a narrow construction of the regulations once they are
adopted. Further, it goes towards safety and protecting consumer
health because the regulations only include biogenerics that can be
thoroughly compared to a reference product and excludes biogenerics
that may be technologically obscure or otherwise controversial. The
narrower the regulations are defined, the tighter the agency is able to
control and regulate what it wants to target. Unlike drugs, this is
necessary for generic biologics because of the heightened molecular
complexity and the element of the unknown. This strategy allows
lawmakers to permit generic biologics that are a reasonable risk, while
blocking the approval of others.
Specifically, the term "biologics" encompasses a vast array of
different types of molecules and products, and as a result, causes
ambiguity and confusion.185 If the term is tailored to a more narrow
definition, appropriate legal standards will be easier to tailor.
186




184 See EMEA, supra note 68, at 4.
185 See Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 185.
186 id.
2007]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
"Biologic biologics" or macro-heterogeneity molecules that are
dependent on source materials should be separated from "biologic
drugs" or non-small molecule products with significant control over the
source material where equivalence can be characterized. 187  For
"biologic biologics," generics may not yet be technologically or legally
possible. 188 Nonetheless, this classification scheme could provide a
reservoir by which new biologics and biotechnologies could expand
within the "biologic biologics" grouping without the restraint of a strict
regulatory framework. 89  More importantly, some type of broad
classification system would permit the creation of biogenerics within
the "biologic drugs" grouping. 190 Further defining these broad classes
into more specific subclasses would give the FDA even more flexibility
to include and/or exclude different biologicals as needed. This type of
classification system either precludes or significantly weakens the
blanket statement that the creation or implementation of a regulatory
system for generic biologics is not possible.' 91
However, the FDA and Congress must be cognizant that this
strategy does not go too far. On one hand, defining terms and
regulations too broadly may be over-inclusive and encompass products
or ideas that were meant to be excluded. On the other hand, if
regulations are defined too narrowly, the language can become
meaningless and the policy is lost in semantics. For example, BIO
objects to the word "comparability" when referring to inter-
manufacturing situations regarding follow-on biologics. 192  BIO
reasons that because "comparability" is a term of art typically
associated with "intra-manufacturer" situations, it should not be used
outside this context.1 9 3 This type of dispute has the potential to hamper
187 Id. at 186-87. "Biologic biologics" includes the traditional biologics, such as
vaccines, toxins, antitoxins, and viral and pathogen particles. Id. at 185. Technology
and human manufacturing have little control over the production of these products
because every manufacture and preparation can differ widely and no amount of
purification can guarantee a uniform product. Id.
188 Id. at 185.
189 Id. Examples of these types of new biotechnologies would include gene therapies,
somatic cell therapies, autologous grafts, cord blod and stem cells, and cells for
cloning. Id.
190 Id. at 187. Examples of "biologic drugs" include biological macromolecules such
as polysaccharides, polynucleotides (DNA, RNA), and polypeptides (proteins). Id.
191 Id. at 192.
192 See Letter firom Sara Radcliffe, supra note 29, at 4.
193 Id. According to BIO, " 'comparability' should be reserved for... changes in the
manufacturing process for existing biotechnological/biological products. The
requirements for demonstrating 'similarity' of protein products made by two different
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the success of new regulations by diverting lawmakers' time and
resources with issues that stymie the process. "Comparability," which
BIO asserts should be completely stricken, unlike "generic," which the
EU has entirely replaced with "follow-on" as a modifier for "biologic,"
can be defined completely contextually. Furthermore, the connotations
of the two words are not analogous. Thus, lawmakers must be careful
not to go too far when drafting regulations and defining terms narrowly
in order to maintain the integrity of such regulations, as well as the
policy and ideas behind them.
B. Potential Biogeneric Pathways Under the Current Law




Under section 5050) of the FDCA, in lieu of clinical trials, the generic
manufacturer must prove pharmaceutical equivalence and
bioequivalence to the brand drug. 95 Because the FDCA was designed
and created for chemical drugs, not biologics,' 96 there is no legal basis
or scientific way of proving bioequivalence under the ANDA process,
which is a necessary precondition.' 97 Biotech companies further argue
that the traditionally abbreviated new drug application pathway for
chemical drugs would be a poor fit for generic biologics because this
system provides generic manufacturers with ingredient guidance, which
would effectively "erode the profit motive that buttresses the very
foundations of the biotech industry."1
98
Additionally, the FDA is statutorily prohibited from requiring
additional investigation, clinical trials, or information other than proof
of bioavailability from generic manufacturers because an ANDA is
intended to provide all the information necessary to determine that the
generic is the same as the listed drug. 199 For this reason, some legal
scholars argue that the use of an ANDA as a pathway to approve
manufacturers may be quite different from (and also more demanding than) those for
demonstrating comparability." Id. at 5.
194 See generally supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
195 Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 194.
196 See Ainsworth, supra note 3, at 21.
'9' See id; ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 25.
198 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1343.
199 Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 194.
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biogenerics is prohibited because the FDA is statutorily estopped from
requesting any additional information about the generic. 200  Without
additional information regarding the biogeneric, the FDA would likely
be unable to approve the application because additional information
would inevitably be needed, such as clinical or non-clinical trials.20 '
Finally, the FDA's initial interpretation of Hatch-Waxman in
1985 as suitable only when drug products are "identical" appears to
foreclose the applicability of 5050) to biologics. 20 2 Whether an ANDA
would be applicable to a biogeneric also might depend on the FDA's
conception of "sameness" or "identical" relative to biogenerics. 20 3 For
small molecules, Hatch-Waxman intended a strict reading of sameness
(i.e., chemically identical molecules) making ANDAs only applicable
where a generic could be proven to be literally identical to the pioneer
drug.20 4 This strict interpretation severely limits the applicability of an
ANDA to generic biologics as a potential regulatory pathway.20 5
b. 505(b)(2)
Section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA allows the FDA to approve drug
products based on published literature and/or information already in
approved applications.20 6 Because some biologics are defined as
"drugs" subject to FDCA regulation,20 7 the FDA may have the
authority to approve a 505(b)(2) NDA for a generic biologic if it is
comparable to an approved brand-name. 20 8 Generic companies would
200 Id. at 196.
201 See Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch).
202 Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 197. The FDA further stated "an abbreviated
application will usually be reserved for duplicates of drug products previously
approved under a full application." Id.
203 Id. See supra Section IV(A) for a discussion on the importance of defining terms
in order to get a regulatory mechanism for biogenerics off the ground.
204 Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 197.
205 Id.
206 Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 179, at 18.
207 Section 123(g) of the FDA Modernization Act (Pub. L. 105-115). Some early
biologic products, such as insulins and human growth hormone (hGH), were
regulated as drugs by CDER as opposed to biologics under CBER. ESPICOM, supra
note 5, at 27.
208 Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 179, at 18; see ESPICOM, supra
note 5, at 27.
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rely on the literature or prior FDA findings of safety and efficacy for
innovator products without the innovator's permission.
209
The FDA's Guidance for Industry, Applications Covered by
Section 505(b) (2)210 lists one example of a potential 505(b)(2) as "an
application for a drug product containing an active ingredient(s)
derived from animal or botanical sources or recombinant technology
where clinical investigations are necessary to show that the active
ingredient is the same as an active ingredient in a listed drug," which
would technically make this section applicable to biologics. 2 1 This
pathway treats the application like a NDA, instead of an ANDA, but
the applicant is allowed to use existing data, rather than the full clinical
trials that a NDA requires, which is comparable to the new EU
legislation.a12 Furthermore, during the 2004 Senate Hearing, Dr. Lester
Crawford, the Acting Commissioner of the FDA, was of the view that
products approved under the FDCA are legally approvable under
505(b)(2) using "non-public data" from the innovator product's earlier
approval.
213
On the other hand, innovator manufacturers assert that the FDA
should not allow an abbreviated pathway because follow-on
manufacturers should undertake some type of clinical testing, which
may not be the same program as the innovator's.21 4 Even if the follow-
on manufacturer performed the same program, because each protein
product is unique, the tests may not be sufficient to demonstrate safety
and efficacy. 2' 5 Thus, BIO advocates an approach that utilizes product
characterization, GMP controls, and relevant nonclinical and clinical
studies in combination.216  Similarly, Pfizer makes the case that
209 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27.
210 The FDA's Guidance for Industry, Applications Covered by Section 505(b)(2) was
issued in October 1999 and lays out the purpose and application of section 505(b)(2).
ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27; FDA, Guidance for Industry Applications Covered by
Section 505(b)(2), http:www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/2853dft.pdf (last visited Jan. 5,
2007). Although the FDA regards the document as provisional, it is still current.
ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27.
211 See ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27; FDA, supra note 216.
212 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 27.
213 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 37; http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.c fm?id= 1 239&wit id=3623.
214 Letter from Sara Radcliffe, supra note 29, at 2.
215 Id.
216 Id. See also BIO Citizen Petition Against 505(b)(2), at
http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followon/BIO_CP--FINALDRAFT 4 22 03.pdf
(last visited Jan. 5, 2007) (arguing against any type of abbreviated approach for
biogenerics either as licensed biological products or approved as new drugs because
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because of the enhanced complexity of generic biologics, nothing less
than full-blown clinical trials should suffice to prove safety and
efficacy. 2
17
However, generic manufacturer Sandoz filed a NDA application
under 505(b)(2) for its biogeneric Omnitrope. 218 The FDA accepted the
application, but deferred its decision in September 2004.219 Sandoz
announced that the agency could not reach a final decision due to
scientific uncertainty and legal issues.2 20 As a result, at this point in
time, the FDA seems unwilling to utilize the 505(b)(2) as a pathway for
biogenerics. This may explain why some commentators believe that
the approval of biogenerics will have to either wait for new regulations
or be approved as new drugs using a NDA or BLA.221
2. Abbreviated Follow-On Pathway Under Section 351 of the
PHSA System
Approval under section 351 of PHSA would be analogous to the "paper
222NDA" procedures for generic drugs prior to Hatch-Waxman. At the
Senate Hearing in June 2004, Dr. Lester Crawford, the Acting
Commissioner of the FDA, noted that there was no legal basis for the
FDA to approve biogenerics under section 351 of the PHSA
of significant differences between chemical drugs and biologics that require each
manufacturer to use original data to ensure patient safety). But see Letter on Behalf of
the FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd/505b2-CPresponse.pdf (last visited Jan. 5,
2007) (denying FDA's BIO petition and other 505(b)(2) petitions).
217 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1344. Pfizer further warns that "it is unethical to subject
patients to any incremental risk when safe and efficacious protein biologics are
available." Id. See, e.g., Sabine Louet, Lessons from Eprex for Biogeneric Firms, 21
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 956, 957 (2003) (predicting that because biologic
erythropoietin alpha (EPO) triggered severe side effects from a immunogenic
reaction, generic biologic companies attempting to manufacture EPO may need to
focus more extensively on immunogenicity during clinical trials). Cf Wainberg,
supra note 23, at 2 (rejecting bioethical or immoral concerns in situations where these
drugs may be otherwise unavailable).
218 EsPICOM, supra note 5, at 29.
219 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 29.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 29, 32. To get approval as an NDA or BLA, the generic manufacturer would
need to conduct the full gamut of preclinical and clinical trials, which may be a
lessened cost depending the level of abridgement for these 'generic' biological
products. Id. at 32.
2 Generic Pharmaceutical Association, supra note 179, at 18; ESPICOM, supra note
5, at 29.
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("CBER") 223 because there is not currently an abbreviated pathway
associated with the regulations. The FDA would have to amend its
regulations from the currently used BLA process to allow approval of
generic biologics based on a "paper BLA" submission.224 The FDA
would also have to issue guidance regarding the necessary requirements
for such a submission.2 25 Similar to an approval mechanism under
505(b)(2), the FDA would have to determine for a "paper BLA"
whether the generic biologic is therapeutically equivalent to its brand-
name counterpart. 22 6 Thus, the concept of the FDCA's abbreviated
system would effectively be implemented into the PHSA system.
C. Additional Considerations to Facilitate the Implementation
and Success of a Biogeneric Mechanism
The FDA may opt to take certain steps to facilitate and expedite the
creation and implementation of an abbreviated pathway for biogenerics.
First, the FDA must identify and address the specific technical issues
hindering the approval of generic biologics. 227 One way to do this
would be to commission studies by impartial organizations, such as the
United States Pharmacopeia or the Institute of Medicine, in
collaboration with interested parties to make these determinations and
quantify exactly what is at issue. 228 Second, the federal government
should provide taxpayer funding for the development of process
validation guidelines. 29 These guidelines could delineate the
manufacturing steps and assay parameters for generic biologic
products.23 °
If the FDA can overcome the opposition from brand-name
companies to allow generic companies to use brand-name data, there is
already precedent for the demonstration of comparability from one
biotech product to another.23' The FDA allows innovator
manufacturers to switch manufacturing sites and cell lines for biologic
223 See http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 1239&wit_id=3623 (last visited
Jan. 5, 2007); ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 37.
224 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 29.
225 Id.
226 Id.




230 Id.23 ' ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 12.
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products and only demonstrate comparability between the old and new
versions, instead of going through a full approval process each time.
232
However, because the FDA has approved two versions of the same
biological product, this does not necessarily apply to two versions of
the same biological product by different companies. 233 This distinction
is further compounded by the serious health risks that can occur from
slight differences in manufacturing for products with a narrow
therapeutic index.2 34 The brand-name company would have access to
product data that the generic manufacturer presumably would not,
unless the FDA made this available.235  Some advocates are
encouraging the FDA to bring these generic and innovator interests
together in order to remedy this solution.236
If the FDA accepts innovator companies' arguments that
generic firms do not know what they are doing and, as a result, cannot
be trusted to make safe and efficacious biologics, the FDA may force
innovator companies to help them. 237  A similar school of thought
advocates that the optimal way to get generic biologics onto the market
is for the generic and innovator companies to work together from the
drug discovery stage on.238 This type of cooperation would distribute
the burden of demonstrating comparability equally onto both generic
and innovator firms. 239  However, in light of the current animosity
between innovator and generic companies 240 and the polarized debate
regarding biogenerics, this option may not gain the necessary support
from all parties involved.
Finally, any biogenerics mechanism that is ultimately adopted
for follow-on biologics should promote and maintain the same policy
232 id.
233 id.
234 Id. at 11.
235 Id. at 12.
236 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1346.
237 See id. at 1345. See also Wainberg, supra note 23, at 2 (asserting that innovator
companies should share the responsibility for treating HIV and license their products
to generic firms that could then manufacture antiretroviral agents that would pass
international muster. This collaboration would obviate the need to prove
bioequivalence for these drugs, which could then be marketed in developing
countries).
238 Herrera, supra note 16, at 1346.
239 Id.
240 When innovator company Genetech's president was asked whether he could
envision a compromise to solve the generic biologics problem, he responded, "Sure,
when pigs fly." Id. at 1345.
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goals that were embodied in the Hatch-Waxman Amendment. 24' First,
Congress should strive to preserve patent protection and a period of
market exclusivity to protect the financial incentives of brand-name
manufacturers. 2,2 This protection is also necessary for these
manufacturers to recoup the money that was invested during the
development of new drugs. 243 To do this, the approval process could
require the generic applicant to acknowledge the original patent holder,
and approval should be delayed until all patent disputes are resolved
and the statutory marketing exclusivity has expired. 2 4
D. Weighing In
In light of the forgoing discussion, an abbreviated biogeneric pathway
attached to the PHSA system would be the optimal course for Congress
to take. This course of action would only require an amendment to the
PHSA that would outline an abbreviated pathway for biologics, which
would parallel exactly what the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Amendment did
under the FDCA for chemical drugs. Additionally, this would require
establishing the specific data requirements necessary to determine
therapeutic equivalence. Once Congress decides that comparability can
be used, the FDA must determine what constitutes a comparability
program. 245  Establishing an independent, standardized reference
product for each generic, similar to what the EU has done, would help
to facilitate these goals.
Using the EU's regulations as a model, comparability may
largely depend on the state of the art of the analytical procedures, the
manufacturing processes employed, and the clinical and regulatory
experiences to date.246 The EU's use of separate regulations for class-
specific products allows greater flexibility by defining the regulations
and breaking down specific data requirements for specific classes
individually. This method also permits the marketing of acceptable
241 See Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 183.
242 See Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 2-3 (statement of Dr. Lester
Crawford).
243 See id.
244 Id. at 7-8.
245 See J.D. Green, L. Tsang, J.A. Cavagnaro. 'Generic' or 'Follow-on' Biologics"
Scientific Considerations and Safety Issues. 3(7) EXPERT OPIN. BIOL. THER. 1019-22
(2003) (listing biochemical characterization studies, biological activity studies,
toxicology studies, and clinical trials, among others, as key elements of a
comparability program).
246 EMEA, supra note 68, at 4.
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biosimilars, but excludes biologics that are too complex to be
thoroughly evaluated for comparability.
Additionally, setting up the system in this way allows
lawmakers to make rolling changes, to lax or tighten regulations,
depending on the nature and structure of the class. 247 This further
contributes to the flexibility of the regulations. Finally, also similar to
the EU's plan, the utilization or reservation by the FDA to consider
products on a case-by-case basis gives the ultimate authority to the
FDA, while enhancing safety by slowing down the regulatory process
and preventing potentially dangerous products from entering the market
without stymieing the entire class. These components would help to
facilitate an effective biogenerics pathway in the United States.
Alternatively, section 505(j) and section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA
are likely to be poor solutions to the issues at hand. First, these
pathways would only be legally applicable to biologics that are
currently regulated under the FDCA. Thus, for biologics under the
PHSA, Congress would either exclude these drugs or work out a
system for including them under the FDCA abbreviated pathway or
equivalent. Congress could bypass this problem by going directly to
the source, the PHSA, and make the abbreviated pathway under the
PHSA applicable to FDCA-approved biologics, instead of trying to
hammer out exceptions to an exception.
Second, there are too many legal and scientific issues to work
around in both of these sections, which makes the clean slate of the
PHSA the more appealing option. Under section 505(j), it is well-
established that bioequivalence studies will be inadequate for
biogenerics,248 which is the defining feature of the ANDA process.
Furthermore, the nature of section 5050) does not go to the inherent
issues enmeshed in biogenerics because the section was drafted for
small-molecule chemical products. For example, the FDA is statutorily
prohibited from requesting additional information from the applicant,
and the language of the amendment speaks in terms of "identical"
generic and innovator drugs.24 9 Both of these concepts are antithetical
to the nature and purpose of biogenerics.
Although section 505(b)(2) fares better than section 505(j), the
PHSA is still the better option. However, section 505(b)(2) may be a
viable pathway for biogeneric products that are regulated under the
FDCA. The drawbacks of this section include the issue of whether or
247 See id at 6.
248 ESPICOM, supra note 5, at 4 1.
249 Id.
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not clinical trials would be necessary as part of this abbreviated
pathway. If Congress decides that they are, this pathway would need to
be modified for biogenerics (without affecting the small-molecule
drugs already under this section) to include this requirement. In
addition, innovator manufacturers are strongly opposed to supplying
innovator data to support follow-on applications. However, these
companies could likely be persuaded to concede the use of such data in
exchange for pro-innovation concessions in the legislation. 250 This
would follow what was done with Hatch-Waxman in 1984 (i.e., the
thirty month stay of approval).2 51  Finally, the FDA's deferral of
biogeneric Omnitrope's application under 505(b)(2) may be indicative
of the agency's hesitancy to use this route because of its legal and/or
scientific inapplicability to biogenerics. This again goes toward the
FDA's intent to create new regulations together.
Congress and the FDA should and will likely require some type
of clinical trials before allowing a generic biologic to be manufactured
and marketed in the United States.252 This will serve two purposes.
First, it will serve as a "middle of the road" compromise between
innovator and generic manufacturer interests. The FDA should not
demand full-blown clinical trials, such as those required for innovator
applicants, but enough to demonstrate immunogenicity, safety, and
efficacy. Secondly, it will provide a sense of security to the patients
and medical community.
In addition to the predictive and informational value of clinical
trials, another factor should be taken into consideration when
determining what level of clinical trials should be required: the
additional cost that effectively discourages smaller generic companies
from entering the market. In comparison to the ANDA process, getting
a generic biologic to market is inherently more time-consuming and
expensive than a chemical drug.253 This will deter companies with the
least experience in running clinical trials from entering the sector
because the level of deterrence is strongly correlated with the level of
requisite clinical trials.254  Thus, at the onset of the creation and
implementation of regulations for biogenerics in the United States, a
low level of clinical trials should be required to satisfy industry
250 Id.
251 id.
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interests, protect the public, and draw generic companies into the
market.
At some point, however, Congress should re-evaluate the
requisite clinical trials for effectiveness to determine their predictive
value relative to pharmacoviligance data, post-approval clinical, and
the dampening effect on generic companies' entry into the market.
After weighing these considerations, Congress can then decide whether
to abandon this requirement or retain it. Additionally, Congress must
be cognizant of the effect of requiring clinical trials for biogenerics on
the availability of these products in international markets, particularly
developing countries. If lives can be saved, Congress must evaluate
whether lowering this requirement at the initial or post-implementation
stage, at least in the international community, would be the right thing
to do and then act accordingly.
Finally, the enormous benefit to the public may outweigh any
potential negative effects of the marketing of biogenerics without
further concrete evidence. 255  Generic biologics will make these
medicinal products available to consumers that may not have been able
to afford them otherwise and significantly impact the health system and
global economy. With proper warnings and without any hard scientific
evidence to the contrary, it could be argued that the public should be
given the option of having this alternative available, instead of being
denied completely.
CONCLUSION
Economic pressures, such as costly medical treatment and burdens on
the health care system, and the EMA's approval of Omnitrope's
comparability studies will likely precipitate the introduction of generic
biologics into the United States market. At the heart of the debate over
biogenerics is a disagreement on science-brand-name companies
argue along pure or hard science lines, while generic companies argue
for "economic" or business science.256 However, each side utilizes
public policy to buttress its position and make a more compelling
argument. Generic interests advocate bringing low cost biologics to the
American public and struggling developing nations, while brand-name
companies push to keep the public safe from the potentially harmful
and unforeseen side-effects of this unpredictable technology.
255 See generally Wainberg, supra note 23.
256 Johnston, supra note 52.
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While the growth of the biogenerics industry is contingent on
the implementation of an effective regulatory system, even once this
system is implemented, the resulting economic repercussions will still
be uncertain. Nonetheless, the United States should follow the EU's
lead and utilize their guidelines as a model to create a pathway that will
unlock this valuable technology. The strong public policy behind
biosimilar technology should push lawmakers to find a way to allow
generic manufacturers to market these products. By taking
prophylactic measures from the beginning, such as defining terms
narrowly and evaluating highly complex molecules on a case-by-case
basis,2 57 a well-drafted biogeneric pathway can make this technology
more safe and efficient for public use. However, lawmakers must be
mindful of the intellectual property rights of innovator firms, which
should be valued as the baseline of the pharmaceutical industry.
258
When biogenerics are proven safe and effective, United States
consumers, employers, and all governmental levels will potentially
realize billions of dollars in savings on these reduced medications.
259
Nonetheless, the smallest steps toward implementing an abbreviated
system will likely instigate waves of litigation from adverse parties.
260
257 See Outi Nieminen and Katrina Nordstrom, Regulation of Biogenerics: A Survey
of Viewpoints, LABORATORY OF BIOCHEMISTRY AND MICROBIOLOGY 399 (2004)
(concluding that biogenerics should be regulated on a case-by-case basis based on
interviews by experts in the pharmaceutical industry); see also Green, supra note 248,
at 1019-22 (stating that a case- by-case approach is favored because the extent of the
data should be determined based on considerations related to product quality, the
disease to be treated, product-specific clinical pharmacology/toxicology issues, and
? roduct-specific clinical trial design issues).
8 Biologic Medicine Hearing, supra note 38, at 3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
259 Dudzinski, supra note 110, at 183.
260 Id.; see also Wayne H. Matelski, Generic Biologics: Outline of Legal and
Regulatory Issues, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE (Sep. - Nov. 2003) (predicting that if
the FDA were to publish new guidance or approve a biogeneric, innovator
manufacturers would likely file lawsuits challenging the FDA's authority under the
current statutory framework).
2007]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 10.3:419
